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WAGE-HOUR COVERAGE OF THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACr
JOHN

J.

GEORGE* AND RICHARD

E.

LAMBERT**

I. INTRODUCTORY

A. Generol Considerations
Prior to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938' state attempts
to remedy sub-standard labor situations had proved largely ineffective. In the sporadic state action ownership of goods often figured
as the pivotal determinant. The FLSA protects workers regardless
of ownership of goods. Process and movement constitute the crucial
test. The Act appears as an extension of the doctrine and power of
Congressional regulation of interstate commerce set forth in the
\Wagner Act cases.'
The geographic avenue provides an initial approach to coverage
of the FLSA. The realm of applicability consists of continental
United States, and all territories and possessions.- Special exceptions are made to rates of pay for workers in Porto Rico and the
Virgin Islands. 4 American workers employed by an American firm
under contracts for the Federal Government at the U. S. Naval
Base in Bermuda are included, though Bermudans hired by their
compatriots at the same base are not included.5
Workers within the wage and hour coverage are basically indi*Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University.
**USNR (ret). Doctoral candidate, Rutgers University.
1. Pub. L. No. 718, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
2. Cooper, "Extra time for Overtime" Now Law, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 28
(1938). As a practicing attorney in Detroit, Mr. Cooper early predicted many
legal and practical problems in operating the Act.
3. § 3 (b), (c), and (j). "All territories and possessions" includes
specifically: Alaska, Hawaii, Porto Rico, Canal Zone, Guam, Guano Islands,
Samoa, Virgin Islands. All significant terms used in §§ 1-19 of the Act are
defined in § 3 thereof.
4. U. S. Dep't of Labor, Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Division, Interpretative Bulletin, General Coverage of the Wage and Hour Provisions of the FLSA, Pt. 776, Subpart A-General 7, n. 16 (1950), hereafter
referred to as Interp. Bull., No. 776. This Bulletin (2, 3) reiterates that all
administrative interpretations issued prior to July 11, 1947, had been rescinded
and withdrawn. Furthermore, all interpretations issued on or after July 11,
1947, inconsistent with FLSA amendments of 1949 were declared ineffective
after January 24, 1950.
5. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U. S. 377 (1948) involving
Bermuda bases leased by the U. S. from Great Britain. This case established
the principle that within the mean'ng of FLSA, these bases and such areas
though subject to the sovereignty of another nation became in effect by the
operation of the agreement "possessions of the United States." See also
United States v. Spelar, 338 U. S. 217 (1949).
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cated by the 1938 Act0 and by Amendments added in 19407 1946,8
1947' and 1949.1 General coverage includes every employee either
.'engaged in commerce" or "inthe production of goods for commerce.""1 Administrative regulations, and administrative and judicial interpretations of "commerce," "goods," "production," and
even of "for" have begun to clarify who is entitled to benefits pre,,cribed by the wages and hours provisions of the statute. A few useful "guides" issued by the Wage and Hours Administrator con-olidate general considerations on worker coverage into rules and
regulations which the Supreme Court views as providing "a practical guide to employers and employees" as to how the Administrator will apply the law until and unless he is reversed or declared incorrect by his own subsequent rulings or by court decisions.12
A decade ago the Supreme Court acknowledged that difficulty
in applying the statutory provisions to fact situations arises partly
from our dual system of government." An early analyst supports
four main conclusions as to statutory coverage: (1) General lines
of coverage are clear; (2) coverage reaches production activities
before interstate traffic begins; (3) the statute reaches production
employees whose product is not directly or immediately put into
interstate commerce; (4) not only the employees whose work engages them directly in the physical processes of commerce or production therefor, but also those whose activities are in employment related thereto in some necessary manner."'
The term employee as defined in § 3(e) of the Act, does not
include a learner or a trainee. 1"
B. Guiding Principles in Determining What Employees and
What Employments are Covered by the Act
Several factors guide the Administrator in determining what
workers and what employments are covered by the WVage and Hour
6. § 6 (treats minimum wages) ; § 7 (deals with maximum hours).
7. Pub. Res. No. 88, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 54 Stat. 616 (1940).
S. Reorg. Plan. No. 2, 60 Stat. 1095 (1946).
9. Pub. L. No. 49, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 61 Stat. 84 (1947) (Portal to
Portal Act).
10. Pub. L. No. 393, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 63 Stat. 910 (1949), effective
January 25, 1950.
11. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 1.
12. Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U. S. 134, 138 (1944); Interp. Bull., No.
776, 1.
13. Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942).
14. Davisson, Coverage of the FLSA, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 1060-1088
(1943). His conclusions are taken into account in section 5 of this paper.
15. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U. S.148, 152-153 (1947).
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provisions of FSLA. Congressional policy as declared in § 2 of the
Act, appears as the first of these interpretive guides. Numerous
court cases recognize Congressional policy as the basic general
"interpretative guide" for the Administrator."6 The essence of this
policy is the exercise of Congressional power over commerce to
remedy "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standards of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
the general well-being of workers" engaged in commerce or in the

production of goods for commerce.- Malcolm M. Davisson has
succinctly summed up the declared policy: "... . to extend Federal
control throughout the farthest reaches of the channels of interstate
commerce."'1
A second interpretive element next after declared Congressional
policy is that coverage is based on the individual worker and not
on blanket applicability to all workers in a particular plant or to all
workers in an industry as a whole. An employer must meet the
statutory requirements for each employee covered.10 Nor can he
escape his obligations under the Act on the claim that he himself is
not engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce.

If any employee is covered, his employer is considered as being so
engaged.20
The next factor related to the preceding one: Employcc status
rather than that of the employer is the basis for determining cover16. Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942) ; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564 (1943) ; 10 E. 40th St. Bldg. v. Callus, 325
U. S. 578 (1945); A. H. Phillirs, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490 (1945);
Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F. 2d 52 (8th Cir. 1940) ; Bowie
v. Gonzales, 117 F. 2d 11 (1st Cir. 1941) ; Armstrong v. Walling, 161 F. 2d
515 (1st Cir. 1947). These cases reveal that Congress did not choose to make
FLSA coextensive int all respects with the limits of its power over Commerce,
nor to apply it to all activities affccting Commerce. See also Interp. Bull., No.
776, 3. In the Jacksonville Papes Co. case, supra, and in Higgins v. Carr
Bros. Co., 317 U. S. 572 (1943) the interpretation of the phrase "in commerce"
was developed.
17. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 3. The purpose of the Act is not to regulate
interstate commerce, but to prevent the shipment in interstate commerce of
goods produced under substandard labor conditions. Roland Elec. Co. v.
Walling, 326 U. S. 657 (1946).
18. Davisson, Coverage of FLSA-Effect given to Adinibistrati've
Decisions Under, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 867-900 (1945). This sequential article,
second in a series, considers the most important FLSA cases decided since the
writing of his earlier article on FLSA, see note 14 supra. See note 16 supra
for a modification of Davisson's sweeping interpretation. See also Overstreet
v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125 (1943).
19. U. S. Dep't Labor, Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Division,
Federal Wage-Hour Law Digest 2 (issued without date).
20. Four cases illustrate this fundamental: Mabee v. White Plains
Pub. Co., 327 U. S. 178 (1946) ; McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. S. 491 (1943) ;
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564 (1943); Kirschbaum v.
Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942).
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age. The main point here is the nature of the worker's tasks. In
determining the nature of any worker's occupational tasks, the employer's business may serve only as a secondary factor, but not
as a primary one. 2 1 While the Administrator followed this principle
from the beginning, the courts apparently shifted to employee basis
only in the Overstreet and subsequent cases. In the Jacksonville and
Higgins cases, the courts relied on the nature of the employer's business."-' The legislators themselves became explicit on the matter
of proper basis in 1949.23
The general rule of broad interpretation of Congressional policy
for coverage under the Act yields to strict interpretation of individual employee status involved in the phrase "engaged in commerce."' " This specific restriction holds even in face of the changed
legislative intention, as indicated in the FLSA Amendments of
1949, to expand the category of workers under "Commerce" while
narrowing the category only of those covered under the correlative term production ("produced") in the original statute.25
The situation often arises that the same employee is actually
engaged in both covered and non-covered tasks. FLSA makes no
stipulation as to percentage, volume, or amount of involvement,
whether of employee or employer, in either commerce or the production of goods for commerce. 26 Contrariwise, the "any-and-every"
principle prevails.'

7

Although workers performing tasks connected with merely isolated, sporadic, or occasional shipments in commerce of insubstantial amounts of goods, are not covered, the law is now settled that
21. "Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House," appended to
the Conf. Rep. on the Amendments, H.R. Rep. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,
hereinafter referred to as H. Mgrs. St. (1949) ; "Statement of a majority of
the Senate conferees," 95 Cong. Rec. 15372-15377 (1949), hereinafter referred to as Sen. Stat., Cong. Rec. (1949).
22. Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S.564 (1943); Higgins
v. Carr Bros. Co., 317 U. S.572 (1943).
23. H. Mgrs. St. (1949).
24. McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. S. 491 (1943).
25. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 4. See also Borden v. Borella, 325 U. S.679
(1945) ; 10 E. 40th St. Bldg. v. Callus, 325 U. S.578 (1945) ; Donovan v.
Shell Oil Co., 168 F. 2d 229 (4th Cir. 1948); Hertz Drivurself Stations v.
United States, 150 F. 2d 923 (8th Cir. 1945); Horton v. Wilson & Co., 223
N. C. 71, 25 S. E. 2d 437 (1943).
26. In this respect of broad applicability, FLSA resembles the Wagner
Collective Bargaining Act. For the most part the language of FLSA is more
restrictive than the National Labor Relations Act.
27. §§ 6 and 7 of FLSA specify "each" and "any" employee engaged
in covered activities. Similarly § 15(a) (1) prohibits the introduction into the
channels of interstate or foreign commerce of "any" goods in the production
of which "any" employee was occupied in violation of §§ 6 and 7. See also
Interp. Bull., No. 776, 5.
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every employee whose engagement in tasks in commerce or the
production of goods for commerce, even though small in amount
yet is regular and recurring,does come within FLSA coverage.28
A further interpretive factor is the standard workweek. 29 Chief
importance here is that "any" part of any particular workweek devoted to covered tasks governs the decision for that workweek. The
proportionof a worker's time in covered or uncovered occupational
tasks is immaterial. If in regular and recurrent tasks he spends any
time in a workweek in covered work, he IS considered as having
been so employed for the entire workweek.30
The Administrator has prescribed at least two specific tests to
clarify covered tasks and covered workers. The first of these tests is:
was there any handling of, or work of any kind on, "goods" or "materials" shipped in commerce or used in production of goods for
commerce? The second test: did the employee engage in any work
"closely related" to and "directly essential" to production of goods
for commerce? 31 Application of these tests necessitates access to
the records statutorily required of the employer to enable him to
segregate and demonstrate whether (a) each worker was engaged
in the workweek in any activities of interstate or foreign commerce,
and (b) whether any part of the week's employment was performed
in the production of goods for commerce.
Lastly, the "regular-rate-of-pay" factor must be considered as
an essential element in the specific Wage and Hour provisions
essential in coverage. The "hourly" wage as. such is not a determinant in fixing on the regular rate of pay. Neither is the method of
28. United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941); Mabee v. White
Plains Pub. Co., 327 U. S. 178 ('1946); Schmidt v. People's Tel. Union of
Maryville, Mo., 138 F. 2d 13 (8th Cir. 1943) ; New Mex. Pub. Serv. v. Engel,
145 F. 2d 636 (10th Cir. 1944) ; Sun Pub. Co. v. Walling, 140 F. 2d 445 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U. S. 728 (1944); Davis v. Goodman Lmbr. Co.,
133 F. 2d 52 (4th Cir. 1943). See also Interp. Bull., No. 776, 5.
29.For a definition of the workweek see "Overtime Compensation,"
Interp. Bull., No. 778, 3 (U. S. Dep't of Labor, W&H & Pub. Contracts
Div., Jan. 1950). The same reference presents a thorough practical treatment
of the surprisingly complicated application of overtime compensation.
30. Gordon's Transports v. Walling, 162 F. 2d 203 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U. S. 774 (1947) ; Roberg v. Henry Phipps Estate, 156 F. 2d 958
(2d Cir. 1946) ; Walling v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co., 59 F. Supp. 348
(W.D. Ky. 1943); Fleming v. Knox, 42 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ga. 1941);
Walling v. Fox-Pelletier Detective Agency, 4 W&H Cases 452, 8 CCH Lab.
Cases fl 62219 (1944).
31. The vital significance of all these terms will be shown in the main
body of this article. See Guess v. Montague, 140 F. 2d 500 (4th Cir. 1943). See
also Interp. Bull., No. 776, 6. The experience of the W&H Div. on the whole
indicates that much so-called "segregation" by employers does not meet the
tests stated above. Many so segregated as non-covered, are found on closer
analysis to be covered.
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calculating compensation. 3- Compensation may be actually made on
basis of piecework, weekly, monthly or annual salary, commission,
or other. The main problem here is in translating method of calculation other than the hourly rate of pay into the statutory minimum
hourly rate. This must be done even though payment by the hour is
not itself a determinant of coverage. 3
So long as the work concerned is performed within the statutorily declared geographical limits, the place of work does not serve
34
as a guiding factor in determining coverage.
C. Workers Covered-DetailedConsiderations
A thorough understanding and determination of what workers
are covered depends on the application of statutory provisions as to
"commerce" and "production of goods for commerce." Examination in detail must be given to eight particular aspects of these provisions under these two chief classifications, four under Commerce
and four under Production. 35
Commerce
WXVorkers employed in the Actual Movement of Commerce.
Workers employed in Occupations Related to Instrumentalities3" of Commerce.
(3) Workers Crossing State Lines.
(4) Commerce Crossing International Boundaries.
(1)
(2)

(5)
(6)

Production
Activities constituting Actual Production.
Employment in a "Closely Related" Process or Occupation
"Directly Essential To" Production.

(7) Employees of Independent Employers Meeting Needs of
Producers for Commerce.
(8) "Goods" and "For Commerce" defined and applied 37 in the
field of Production.
32. United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U. S. 360 (1945).
33. The Administrator's Regulations on this statutory requirement are
published in U. S. Dep't of Labor W&H Division, Records Pt. 516. For
methods of translating other forms of compensation into the equivalent hourly
rate for purposes of complying with §§ 6 and 7 of the Act, consult the
Division's Interp. Bull., Board, Lodging, and Other Facilities, Pt. 777.
34. Walling v. American Needlecrafts, 139 F. 2d 60 (6th Cir. 1943);
Walling v. Twyeffort, Inc., 158 F. 2d 944 (2d Cir. 1947) ; McComb v. Homeworkers' Handicraft Coop., 176 F. 2d 633 (4th Cir. 1949).
35. Coverage of employees under Commerce is treated in Pt. II hereof,
of employees in production for commerce under Pt. III. In actual applications
of the statutes the two elements of (1) Goods and (2) the bearing of the
preposition FOR in production are given practically equal significance with
the two main classifications of Commerce and Production.
36. For a list of such instrumentalities, see infra text to note 53.
37. Summarized and adopted from Interp. Bull., No. 776, 8-46.
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WORKERS COVERED

A. Workers Engaged in Commerce
1. Definition of Commerce
The term Commerce is defined in § 3 (b) (as amended by § 3 (a)
of FLSA Amendments of 1949), to indicate the occupational activities covered by §§ 6 and 7 of the Act, and states:
"'Commerce' means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several
States or between
'38
any State and any place outside thereof.
"State" refers not only to any of the 48 States but also to the
District of Columbia and to any territory or possession of the
United States.
"Commerce" is defined broadly and includes but does not limit
application to "commercial" transactions involved in Trade, to
Transportation, or to Traffic in "goods." Movement of persons as
well as of things is included. Transmission or communication across
state lines may cover more or other than "goods." ' 9 "Goods" is itself
40
also broadly defined by the Act.
2. Scope of "In Commerce"
Despite its obviously broad definition, "Commerce" does not
statutorily include all employees engaged in activities which merely
"affect" interstate or foreign commerce, but the courts have made
it clear that coverage extends to every employee engaged "in the
channels of" such commerce or in activities so closely related to
such commerce as to be considered part of it.41
One practical question asked by the courts and by the Administrator in applying the clause or interpreting it in particular situations, is whether, without the particular service involved, interstate
42
(or foreign) commerce would be impeded, impaired, or abated.
Another is, does the service contribute materially to the consum38. "Any place outside thereof" is not restricted to mean to another State
or Country, but ship-to-shore transactions or shipments from shore to ship
for consumption at sea, are likewise included. See Interp. Bull., No. 776, 9.
39. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 8.
40. Infra to text following note 146.
41. Specific and detailed inclusions are indicated in each of these five
cases: Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564 (1943) ; Overstreet
v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125 (1943) ; McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. S.
491 (1943); Boutell v. Walling, 327 U. S. 463 (1946); J. F. Fitzgerald
Construction Co. v. Pedersen, 324 U. S. 720 (1945).
42. Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F. 2d 543 (8th Cir. 1945),
aff'd, 327 U. S. 757 (1946) ; New Mex. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Engel, 145 F. 2d 636
(10th Cir. 1944).

IVAGE-HOUR COVERAGE

mation of transactions in such commerce ?43 Thirdly, does it enable
existing instrumentalities of commerce to accomplish the movement of such commerce and free it from obstacles ?41
3. ,-ctual Aovement of Commerce
a. Workers in Instrumentalitiesof Commerce
Typical (but not exclusive) of industries whose workers are
covered because the industries in which they are employed constitute
the instrumentalities and channels of interstate and foreign commerce are the following:
45
Telephone4 6
Telegraph
47
Radio and Television
5
Transportation and Shipping
49
\rorkers in banking and insurance and newspaper publishing are
likewise generally covered.
b. Employees Whose Work Is "Essential" to Commerce
Many types of business involve tasks which are an essential
part of the stream of interstate or foreign commerce. Employees
performing such tasks consequently are held to be engaged in commerce within the statutory coverage. Warehouses receiving or
43. Walling v. Sondock, 132 F. 2d 77 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318
U. S. 772 (1943) ; Horton v. Wilson & Co., 223 N. C. 71, 25 S. E. 2d 437
(1943). The Court stated that an employee is engaged "in commerce" if his
services (not too remotely but substantially and directly) aid such commerce.
44. Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125 (1943) ; J. F. Fitzgerald Construction Co. v. Pedersen, 324 U. S. 720 (1945) ; Bennett v. V. P.
Loftis, 167 F. 2d 286 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Walling v. McCrady Construction Co.,
156 F. 2d 932 (3d Cir. 1946) ; Ritch v. Pudget Sound Bridge & Dredging
Co., 156 F. 2d 334 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Walling v. Patton-Tully Transp. Co., 134
F. 2d 945 (6th Cir. 1943).
45. Schmidt v. People's Tel. Union of Maryville, Mo., 138 F. 2d 13
(8th Cir. 1943); North Shore Corp. v. Barnett, 143 F. 2d 172 (5th Cir.
1944) ; Strand v. Garden Valley Tel. Co., 51 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1943).
46. W. U. Tel. Co. v Lenroot, 323 U S. 490 (1945) ; W. U. Tel. Co. v.
McComb, 165 F. 2d 65 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 862 (1948);
Moss v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 42 F. Supp. 807 (M.D. Ga. 1941).
47. Wabash Radio Corp. v. Walling, 162 F. 2d 391 (6th Cir. 1947);
Wilson v. Schuman, 140 F. 2d 644 (8th Cir. 1944).
4S. Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572 (1942) ; Knudsen v.
Lee & Simmons, 163 F. 2d 95 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Hargis v. Wabash Ry. Co.,
163 F. 2d 608 (7th Cir. 1947) ; Walling v. Keansburg Steamboat Co., 162
F. 2d 405 (3d Cir. 1947) ; Rockton & Rion R. R. Co. v. Walling, 146 F. 2d
111 (4th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 880 (1945) ; Walling v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 65 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Mo. 1946); Walling v.
Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 61 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. S.C. 1945).
49. Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U S. 186 (1946) ; Sun. Pub.
Co. v. Walling, 140 F. 2d 445 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U. S. 728 (1944) ;
McComb v. Dessau, 9 W & H Cases 332, 17 CCH Lab. Cases f 65643 (1950).
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distributing goods across state lines afford an active example; their
employees are coveredA0
c. Use of Communications Across State Lines
Likewise covered are private employees such as department
managers, heads of sections, secretaries and correspondence clerks,
shipping and order clerks, whose work involves the continued use
of interstate mails, telephone, telegraph, or similar communication
services across state lines.5 1 Notwithstanding this broad coverage
the principle of "Essentiality" does not mean that any use by an
employee of the mails and other channels of communication for his
employer is sufficient to establish coverage. But if an employee, as a
"regular and recurrent" part of his duties, uses such instrumentalities in his normal employment in obtaining or communicating information or in sending or receiving written reports or messages, or
sending or receiving orders for goods or services, or plans or other
documents across state lines, he come within the scope of the Act
as an employee directly engaged in the work of interstate "communication."5 2
4. Workers in Other OccupationsConnected with Instrunientalitics
of Commerce
a. Maintenance and Repair Workers
Workers performing tasks involved in the maintenance, repair,
alterations, or improvement of existing instrumentalities of commerce compose a large category "engaged in Commerce." Examples
of such instrumentalities of commerce include railroads, highways
and city streets, pipe lines, telephone and electric transmission
lines, rivers, and other waterways over which interstate (or foreign)
commerce moves; likewise
"....

terminals for same, such as railroad and bus and truck

stations; steamship harbors, docks, wharves, and piers, and airports; telephone exchanges, radio and TV stations; bridges &
ferries carrying interstate traffic even though they are wholly
within a single state;
dams, dikes, revetments, and levees which facilitate such movements by air, land, or sea;
warehouses and other distribution depots for receipt and ship50. Phillips v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490 (1945) ; Clyde v. Broderick,
144 F. 2d 348 (10th Cir. 1944).
51. McComb v. Weller, 9 W & H Cases 53 (1949); Phillips v. Meeker
Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 63 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1945) ; Anderson
Bros. Corp. v. Flynn, 309 Ky. 633, 218 S. W. 2d 653 (1949); Yunker v.
Abbye Employment Agency, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 715 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1941).
52. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 11.
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ment of such goods; the vehicles themselves in the several means
of transportation-ships, cars, aircraft." 3
Thus maintenance-of-way employees,5 4 workers (including office
staffs, guards, watchmen) engaged on contracts in maintenance,
repair, reconstruction, or other improxement project on such instrumentalities of commerce, are covered; likewise employees similarly engaged in the maintenance or alteration and repair of ships55
or trucks5'3 used as instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce.
b. Watchien and Guards
'Watchmen or guards of ships or vehicles regularly used in commerce,5 7 or on similar duty at warehouses, railroad yards, or equipment areass where goods moving in such commerce are temporarily held; porters, janitors, or persons in other maintenance capacities at transportation terminals 5 ---coverage applies to all these.
Despite particular business activities in which employed, not
all employees in the above two categories of maintenance and repair
workers, and guards and watchmen are covered. Only those workers in these two categories who are directly connected with instrumentalities of commerce as indicated are included. Many workers
are engaged in activities less directly connected with the functioning
of instrumentalities of commerce or too remote from interstate or
53. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 12.
54. North Shore Corp. v. Barnett, 143 F. 2d 172 (5th Cir. 1944) ; Davis
v. Rockton & Rion R. R. Co., 65 F. Supp. 67 (W.D. S.C. 1946) ; Palmer v.
Howard, 12 CCH Lab. Cases ff 63756; Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. R. Co., 1 W & H Cases 289, 2 CCH Lab. Cases 18564 (1940).
55. Walling v. Keansburg Steamboat Co., 162 F. 2d 405 (3d Cir.
1947) ; Slover v. VWathen, 140 F. 2d 258 (4th Cir. 1944).
56. Morris v. McComb, 332 U. S. 422 (1947); Boutell v. Walling,
327 U. S. 463 (1946) ; Skidmore v. John J. Casale, Inc., 160 F. 2d 527 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 812 (1947); Hertz Driveurself Stations v.
United States, 150 F. 2d 923 (8th Cir. 1945) ; Walling v. Sturm & Sons, Inc.,
6 W & H Cases 131, 10 CCH Lab. Cases ff 62980 (1946).
57. Slover v. Wathen, 140 F. 2d 258 (4th Cir. 1944) ; Cannon v. Miller,
22 Wash. 2d 227, 155 P. 2d 500 (1945) ; Agosto v. Rocafort, 5 W & H
Cases 176, 9 CCH Lab. Cases 1 62610 (1945).
58. Mid-Continent Pet. Corp. v. Keen, 157 F. 2d 310 (8th Cir. 1946);
Engelbretson v. E. J. Albrecht Co., 150 F. 2d 602 (7th Cir. 1945); Walling
v. Mut. Wholesale Food & Sup. Co., 141 F. 2d 331 (8th Cir. 1944); Walling
v. Sondock, 132 F. 2d 77 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Reliance Storage & Insp. Co. v.
Hubbard, 50 F. Supp. 1012 (W.D. Va. 1943); McComb v. Russell Co., 9
W & H Cases 258, 17 CCH Lab. Cases ff 65519 (1949); Walling v. FoxPelletier Detective Agency, 4 W & H Cases 452, 8 CCH Lab. Cases ff 62219

(1944).

59. Williams v. Jacksonville Term. Co., 315 U. S. 386 (1942) ; Hargis
v. Wabash Ry. Co., 163 F. 2d 608 (7th Cir. 1947) ; Mornford v. Andrews,
151 F. 2d 511 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Walling v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 61 F.
Supp. 992 (E.D. S.C. 1945); Rouch v. Continental Oil Co., 55 F. Supp.
315 (D. Kan. 1944). The Williams case also established the fact that tips are
included as wages within the meaning of the Act.
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foreign commerce to establish coverage. ° For instance, a cook preparing meals for workmen repairing tracks over which interstate
trains operate, is not covered. 61 Nor is a porter caring for washrooms and lockers in a garage which is not itself an instrumentality
of commerce, although used for servicing trucks both in intrastate
and interstate commerce.6

2

c. Other Covered Categories in Activities Incidental to
Instrumentalitiesof Commerce
Coverage extends to employees in other kinds of work which
contribute directly to the movement of commerce by providing
goods, services, or facilities to be used or consumed by instrumentalities of commerce in the performance of their functions in transportation, transmission, communication, or other form of movement.63

Examples of covered employments are those in which workers
provide such things as electric energy, 4 steam, fuel, or water,62
needed for the movement of commerce to such carriers as railroads,
airports, radio stations, and telephone exchanges. Work of this
nature is considered "so rela:ed to the actual movement of commerce as to be considered as an essential and indispensable [italics
supplied] part thereof, and without which it would be impeded or
impaired.

' ' 66

d. Employees Traveling Across State Lines
Such employees as salesmen, traveling buyers, service people,
construction crews, collectors, circusmen, road showmen, orchestras,
and similar entertainment groups, raise the question whether the
Act applies to employees whose work requires them to cross state
lines, as distinct from merely traveling to and from work and
7
lodging

No precise formula for all such situations is feasible. Questions
60. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 13.
61. McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. S. 491 (1943).
62. Skidmore v. John J. Casale, Inc., 160 F. 2d 527 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U. S. 812 (1947) (of total use of trucks serviced, from 10 to 25
per cent was in interstate commerce).
63. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 14.
64. Walling v. Connecticut Co., 154 F. 2d 552 (2d Cir. 1946); New
Mex. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Engel, 145 F. 2d 636 (10th Cir. 1944).
65. Lewis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 154 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1946);
Walling v. Connecticut Co., 154 F. 2d 552 (2d Cir. 1946). Such employees,
moreover, would also be covered as engaged in the "production of goods for
commerce," hence doubly covered.
66. New Mex. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Engel, 145 F. 2d 636 (10th Cir. 1944).
Cited and quoted in Interp. Bull., No. 776, 14.
67. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 14.
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of degree are inevitably a factor. As a general rule, however, employees who regularly cross state lines in the performance of their
duties, are covered as being engaged in commerce. 6 s Contrariwise,
an employee who in only isolated or sporadic instances so crosses
state lines in connection with his work which is otherwise intrastate
is not covered. The facts in each individual case must govern. 69
e. Commerce Crossing InternationalBoundaries
An amendment to § 3(b) of the Act effective January 25, 1950,
places employees of importers on a similar plane with employees of
exporters.7" Earlier the employees of importers were in a less
favorable position; these employees whose work related solely to the
flow of commerce into a State from places outside it which were not
"States" as defined in the Act, were not covered, although employees engaged in work connected with the flow of commerce
71
out of the State to such places were covered.
B. Wllorkcrs Engaged in Production of Goods for Commerce
Covered by FLSA
1. Definition of "Engaged" and "Production"
Of the three interrelated essential elements of coverage in the
phrase production of goods for conzmerce, each of which ((1) production; (2) goods; (3) for commerce), is comprehensively defined by Congress, "production" has proved much more difficult in
interpretation and application than either goods or for commerce.
The pertinent section in the Act explains:
"'Production' means produced, manufactured, mined, handled, or in any other manned worked on in any State: and for
the purposes of this Act an employee shall be deemed to have
been engaged in the production of goods if such employee was
employed in producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any other manner worling on such goods, or in
any closely related process or occupation directly essential to the
production thereof, in any State." [Italics supplied.]" 68. Reck v. Zarnocay, 264 App. Div. 520, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 394 (lst Dep't
1942) ; Colbeck v. Dairyland Creamery Co., 70 S. D. 283, 17 N. W. 2d 262
(1945).
69. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 15.
70. H. Mgrs. St., 13-14 (1949).
71. § 3(b), containing the definition of commerce, originally referred
to commerce from any State to "any place outside thereof." The amendment
substituted the word "between" for "from," and substituted "and" for "to"
so that the clause now reads: "between any State and any place outside
thereof."
72. § 3(j). See Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S.657 (1946);
Borden v. Borella, 325 U. S.679 (1945) ; Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323
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As indicated in the italicized portions of the section just quoted,
two other major elements are introduced to add to the complexity
of interpreting coverage--"closely related" and "directly essential.'
Neither of these two new elements nor any of the three basic ones"production," "goods," or "for commerce"- will be considered
if the employee would already be covered because engaged in cominerce as treated in the first section of this paper. Examples of such
double coverage include employees of common carriers who handle
or work on goods eventually entering into interstate transit; personnel of a telegraph company who prepare messages for interstate
transmission; television cameramen who photograph sports or news
73
events for multistate TV production.
Section 15(a) (1) bars from interstate commerce any goods in
the production of which any worker was employed in violation of
the minimum-wage or overtime-pay provisions, and § 15(b) provides that in determining whether a worker was so occupied, employment in any place where .goods shipped or sold in commerce
were produced within 90 days prior to removal of goods, shall
74
be prima facie evidence of such employment.
2. General Scope of "Production" Coverage
Thus it is clear that typical (but not exclusive) production coverage includes the large class of workers employed in mines, oilfields,
quarries, factories, processing plants, or distribution centers where
goods are in any way produced or readied for commerce. Production employees covered are not limited to those occupied in actual
physical work on processing or handling the product itself, nor even
to such workers in the factories, mines, warehouses, where goods intended for commerce are produced or stored in transit. It suffices for
coverage if the employee's tasks bear the required relationship to
such production, regardless of r(1
) whether his work takes him into
actual contact with such goods, or (2) into the plants where they
are produced or handled, or (3) his employer may be other than
the producer of goods for commerce.7"
Production coverage embraces many workers who serve production enterprises in capacities which do not involve working
U. S. 126 (1944); Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942): also
H. Mgrs. St. 14 (1949) ; Sen. Statement, Cong. Rec. 15372 (Oct. 19, 1949),
hereafter referred to as Sen. St., Cong. Rec. (1949).
73. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U. S. 490 (1945).
74. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 16-17.
75. Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657 (1946): Borden v.
Borella, 325 U. S.679 (1945) ; Walton v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U. S.
540 (1940) ; Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942).
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directly on production goods but which are "closely related" and
"directly essential" to successful occupations in producing goods
73
for commerce.
As a general rule then, if a worker is gainfully employed in a
place where goods are produced, processed, or otherwise handled
which are sold or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, he is
considered as covered, subject of course to analysis in each particular case of the close relationship and direct essentiality of his
77
activity to production for commerce.
3. Production Employments Covered
a. Activities Constituting Production
Workers employed in producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, or in any other manner "working on" GOODS, including
parts and ingredients thereof, for interstate or foreign commerce,
are considered for the purposes of the Act as actually engaged in the
78
production of such goods, and are covered.
Not only is the work involved in making the products of mining,
manufacturing, or processing operations included under coverage,
but also activities embraced in "handling, transporting, or in an
other manner working on" the goods. This comprehensive coverage
applies regardless of whether the goods are to be processed further
or are so-called "finished goods." Each and every step of incidental
operation, whether manufacture or not, in readying the goods into
a condition for entering the stream of commerce is legally comprehended in the term "production" 7'9 within the meaning of the Act.
b. The Physical Labor Factorin Production Coverage
The physical labor factor in production coverage is applied to a
wide variety of employments. Some of these, as illustrative but not
exhaustive, are here enumerated:
Sorting, screening, grading, storing, packing, labeling, addressing, or otherwise handling or working on goods in shipping
rooms, warehouses, distribution yards, grain elevators, etc., in
76. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 18.
77. Guess v. Montague, 140 F. 2d 500 (4th Cir. 1943) ; cf. Armour &Co.
v. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126 (1944).
78. H. Mgrs. St. 14 (1949) ;Sen. St., Cong. Rec. 15372 (1949).
79. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U. S.490 (1945); Walling v.
Friend, 156 F. 2d 429 (8th Cir. 1946) ; Walling v. Comet Carriers, 151 F.
2d 117 (2d Cir. 1945); Phillips v. Star Overall Dry Cleaning Laundry Co.,
149 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). ccrt. denied, 327 U. S. 780 (1946) ; Walling v.
Griffin Cartage Co., 62 F. Supp. 396, aff'd. 153 F. 2d 587 (6th Cir. 1946).
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preparation for shipment of the goods out of the State ; "
Handling of ingredients, such as scrap iron, of steel used in
building ships which will move in commerce;31
Handling and caring for livestock at stockyards where livestock is destined for interstate shipment on the hoof, "12 and "meat
products" after slaughtering and processing ;s
Handling or transporting containers to be used in shipping
products interstate ;84

1'ransporting oil (within a single State) to a refinery ," or
lumber to a mill (also within the same State),86 if products of
refinery or mill are to be sent out of the State;
Transporting parts or ingredients of other types of goods
(or the finished goods themselves) between processors, manufacturers, and storage places located in a single State, for eventual outstate shipment whether in same or altered form; [Italics
supplied. ],'-,

Repairing or otherwise working on ships ;" vehicles

;"'

ma-

chinery ;90 clothing ;91 or ozher goods which may be expected to

move interstate.
Some of these physical-labor production coverage activities are
manifestly and simultaneously commerce coverage as well, since
the activiites are so closely related to "commerce" as distinct from
80. McComb v. Wyandotte Furniture Co., 169 F. 2d 766 (8th Cir.
1948) ; Clyde v. Broderick, 144 F. 2d 348 (10th Cir. 1944); Walling v.
Mut. Wholesale Food & Sup. Co., 141 F. 2d 331 (8th Cir. 1944) ; Walling v.
Yeakley, 140 F. 2d 830 (10th Cir. 1944) ; W. Kentucky Coal Co. v. Walling,
153 F. 2d 582 (6th Cir. 1946) ; Walling v. Home Loose Leaf Tobacco Whse.
Co., 51 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Ky. 1943) ; Shain v. Armour & Co., 50 F. Supp.
907 (W.D. Ky. 1943); Walling v. McCracken County Peach Growers'
Ass'n, 50 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Ky. 1943).
81. Bracey v. Luray, 138 F. 2d 8 (4th Cir. 1943).
82. Walling v. Friend, 156 F. 2d 429 (8th Cir. 1946).
83. Fleming v. Swift & Co., 41 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Ill. 1941) ; McComb
v. Benz Co., 9 W&H Cases 277 (1949).
84. Walling v. Villaume Box & Lmbr. Co., 58 F. Supp. 150 (D. Minn.
1943).
85. Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Hargrave, 129 F. 2d 655 (10th Cir.
1942) ; Boling v. R. J. Allison Co., 4 W&H Cases 500 (1944).
86. Hanson v. Lagerstrom, 133 F. 2d 120 (8th Cir. 1943).
87. Walling v. Griffin Cartage Co., 62 F. Supp. 396 (E.D. Mich. 1945),
aff'd, 153 F. 2d 587 (6th Cir. 1946).
88. Slover v. Wathen, 140 F. 2d 258 (4th Cir. 1944).
89. Hertz Drivurself Stations v. United States, 150 F. 2d 923 (8th Cir.
1945) ; Walling v. Armbruster, 51 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Ark. 1943) ; McComb
v. Weller, 9 W&H Cases 53 (1949) ; Walling v. Sturm & Sons, Inc., 6 W&H
Cases 131, 10 CCH Lab. Cases 62980 (1946).
90. Engelbretson v. E. J. Albrecht Co., 150 F. 2d 602 (7th Cir. 1945);
Guess v. Montague, 140 F. 2d 500 (4th Cir. 1943).
91. Phillips v. Star Overall Dry Cleaning Laundry Co., 159 F. 2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U. S. 780 (1946) ; Walling v. Belikaft, 59 F.
Supp. 167 (S.D. N.Y. 1944), aff'd, 147 F. 2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Campbell
v. Zavelo, 243 Ala. 361, 10 So. 2d 29 (1942).
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"production," as to be commerce 02 for all practical purposes, and
particularly for the purposes of the Act. Since such employments
are already covered under Commerce, their validity as Production
needs no consideration. Thus the principle is established that labor
"in commerce" as broadly construed is the primary consideration,
and production for commerce is secondary or contributory to the
basic commerce aspect of employment.
Personnel of a telegraph company who prepare messages for
interstate transmission, television cameramen who photograph
sports or news events for multi-State TV reproduction, truck crewmen and railroad crewmen hauling goods interstate are excluded
from production coverage since already covered under "commerce."
c. Nonmanual Occupations
Production coverage includes not only the manual, physical
labor involved in the primary production and subsequent processing,
handling, and working on the tangible substances of a production
enterprise, but also the administration, control, policy-making and
planning, systematizing, superintendence and supervision of all the
physical processes. This includes of course the purchasing, personnel, safety, financial, accounting and clerical occupations required
3
in conducting production .9
Employees who perform any of the variety of tasks indicated in
the preceding paragraph are an integral and essential part of the
production entity of a modern industrial organization. Obviously no
enterprise produces goods for commerce solely with manual workers.94 In view of this practical reality, the Supreme Court holds that
all workers who perform such tasks "are actually engaged in the
production of goods for coinerce just as much as those who
process and work on the tangible products." [Italics supplied.] 9'
4. Processes or Occupations "Closely Related" and "Directly
Essential" to Production for Commerce
\Vihile these terms--"Closely Related" and "Directly Essential"
-were considered by the Congressional framers to be more precise
than the word "necessary" for which they were substituted in 1949,
92. E.g.. Hertz Drivurself Stations v. United States, 150 F. 2d 923
(8th Cir. 1945) ; Engelbretson v. E. J.Albrecht Co., 150 F. 2d 602 (7th Cir.
1945) ; Slover v. Wathen, 140 F. 2d 258 (4th Cir. 1944) ; Walling v. Sturm
& Sons, Inc., 6 W&H Cases 131, 10 CCH Lab. Cases ff 62980 (1946).
93. Borden v. Borella, 325 U. S.679 (1945) ; Hertz Drivurself Stations
v. United States, 150 F. 2d 923 (8th Cir. 1945) ; Callus v. 10 E. 40th St. Bldg.,
146 F. 2d 438 (2d Cir. 1944), rety'd on other grounds, 325 U. S.578 (1945).
94. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 21.
95. Borden v. Borella, 325 U. S.679 (1945).
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they yet do not yield to exact definition. The two terms taken together were designed to describe situations wherein a worker's
occupation bears such a relationship to the production of goods for
interstate or foreign commerce as to be both (1) close enough as
distinguished from remote or tenuous, and (2) of direct aid to the
employer in a practical sense of providing something essential to
the effective, efficient, and satisfactory operation of the productive
process. 6
Not all "Closely related" employment tasks are "directly essential" to production; nor do all directly essential activities meet the
test of close relationship. Must each of these two crucial phrases in
the amended act extending production coverage beyond the physical
process of manufacture be satisfied, or need only one be met? And
if only one, may it be either one? Or must one of the phrases govern
regardless of the other; and if so, which one? These questions arose
early in the administration of the Act, and have been answered by
the Administrator: each must be met.9T
a. Effect of the Terms "Closely Related" and "Directly Essential"
The two phrases, "closely related" and "directly essential" serve
to extend production coverage immeasurably. Coverage may be
determined either on the basis of actual physical production or because the work is closely related and directly essential, but according to recent decision, if determined on either ground, it is not
necessary to determine whether coverage would be established on
the other ground."
These two pivotal phrases were incorporated into the Act with
the FLS Amendments of 1949, replacing the less precise and more
inclusive word "necessary." Originally, the Act covered employees
engaged "in any process or occupation necessary to the production"
of goods for commerce. This particular feature of the 1949 Amendments has given rise to more difficulty of precise interpretation and
more litigation than any other in the Act. The Wage and Hour and
Public Contracts Division devote to it more than one-third of their
interpretive bulletin expounding the whole field of coverage, citing
many cases. 9' The legislative history of the Act shows that the
language of the last clause of § 3 (j) is intended to narrow the scope
96. H. Mgrs. St. 15 (1949); Sen. St., Cong. Rec. 15372 (1949). S~e
also Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942).
97. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 22-23.
98. Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 124 F. 2d 42 (5th Cir.
1941), aff'd, 317 U. S.88 (1942).
99. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 21-36.
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of coverage1' with respect to production workers not engaged in
coimnerce. u.
Because of this narrowing revision, some employees who might
have met the test of necessity under the original wording of the
Act, are now not covered unless their work is both closely and
directly essential to such production. 1
Because this feature of the Act (§ 3(j)) uses the conjunction
or." question might arise as to this "both-and" interpretation. The
reconciling explanation is a simple one. The clause provides coverage for employment "in any closely related process or occupation
directly essential to the production thereof in any State." Misunderstanding results from construing the conjunction"or" cumulative and not alternative in its content and application. The phrase
is not dealing with two different things- (1) closely related process,
and (2) occupation directly essential to the production thereof,
joined (or opposed) by use of "or." This was not the intention of
the legislators. The many pages in the W&H coverage bulletin of
interpretations, the House Managers' Statement, and application
of the language of the Amendment in many court cases witness the
true meaning. The true meaning is that "closely related" is an
adjective phrase modifying not the single noun "process," but the
compound noun-phrase "process or occupation." Any alternative
significance of "or" applies as between "process" and "occupation."
Similarly, the adjectival phrase "directly essential" applies not to
the single noun "occupation" which immediately precedes it, but to
the same compound noun-phrase "process or occupation." Part of
the confusion arises of course from the fact that one adjectival
phrase precedes the first word in the compound noun-phrase and
the second adjectival phrase follows the final member of the nounphrase.
The foregoing interpretation is implicit in the law as considered'
by all three branches of the government-Legislative, Executive,
and the judiciary. The legislative history of FLS Amendments of
'149,"' the interpretative provisions of the \V&H AdministraId. at 22.
10.
101. H. Mgrs. St. 14 (1949) ; Sen. St., Cong. Rec. 15372 (1949) ; Statement of Ch. of Committee on Education & Labor explaining the conference
agreement to the House of Rep., Id. at 15135; colloquy between Reps. McConnell and Javits, Id. at 15129. Cf. statements of Reps. Barden and Brehm (the
latter subsequently convicted of unlawful acceptance of campaign funds from
hi office staff), Id. at 15131-32; statement of Sen. Taft, Cong. Rec. A-1162
(1950).
102. H. Mgrs. St., passim, esp. 14 and 15 (1949) ; Sen. St., Cong. Rec.
15372 (1949). H. Mgrs. St. 14 (1949) uses the expression: "All employees
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tion, 10 3 and a wide range of illustrative court cases support this
0 4
statement.1
While the coverage or noncoverage of countless employees may
now be determined with reasonable certainty, obviously no precise
line of inclusion or exclusion can be drawn. Borderline problems
will inevitably arise which can be determined with finality only by
authoritative court decisions. For example, though the legislators in
1949 deliberately narrowed the extension of the production coverage and yet later widened it again somewhat from the first amendatory phrasing by replacing the word "indispensable" with the
phrase "directly essential,"' 10 5 they expressed their intention to
leave undisturbed particular areas of coverage already established
by court decisions. 0 6
b. Distinguishingand Applying "Closely Related" and "Directly
Essent~ial" Standards
Close relationship of an occupation to the whole process of production may be tested by a wide variety of revelant factors. Direct
essentiality in its turn depends solely on considerations of need or
function in the entire production process. As used in the amendment,
direct essentiality refers only to the bearing of the individual employee's particular tasks on production, regardless of nature or purpose of employer's business. Criteria for determining closeness of
perform activities that are closely related and directly essential to the production of goods for commerce."
103. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 23-26. § 19(b), 31, is entitled: "Extent of
coverage under 'closely related' and 'directly essential' clause." (Note: linkage with conjunction "and," and the word "clause" is in the singular.) On
page 32 is a discussion of situation,; where the work of an employee is directly
essential but does not meet the "closely related" test, hence not covered.
104. Farmers' Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U. S. 755 (1949) ; Roland
Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657 (1946) ; Borden v. Borella, 325 U. S.
679 (1945) ; 10 E. 40th St. Bldg. v. Callus, 325 U. S.578 (1945) ; Armour &
Co. v. Wantock, 323 U. S.126 (1944) ; Walton v. Southern Package Corp.,
320 U. S.540 (1944); Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S.
88 (1942); Kirschbaum v. Walling. 316 U. S.517 (1942); Brogan v. National Surety Co., 246 U. S.257 (1918) ; Walling v. W. D. Haden Co., 153
F. 2d 196 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Reynolds v. Salt River Valley Water Users
Ass'n, 143 F. 2d 863 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Hanson v. Lagerstrom, 133 F. 2d 120
(8th Cir. 1943) ; Bracey v. Luray, 138 F. 2d 8 (4th Cir. 1943) ; Walling v.
Peoples' Packing Co., 132 F. 2d 236 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S.
774 (1943) ; Consolidated Timber Co. v. Womack, 132 F. 2d 101 (9th Cir.
1942) ; Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Hargrave, 129 F. 2d 655 (10th Cir.
1942) ; Phillips v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 63 F. Supp. 733 (D.
Minn. 1945).
105. H. Mgrs. St. (1949). The phrase "directly essential" was adopted
by the Conf. Comm. in lieu of the word "indispensable" contained in the Amendment first passed by the House. If "indispensability" had become the test, many
workers now covered would have been excluded.
106. Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S.517 (1942).

IVAGE-HOUR COVERAGE

relationship, on the other hand, cannot be limited to those which
show this closeness in terms of need or function. Close relationship
is thus a more inclusive phrase than its narrower counterpart,
direct essentiality. This nice distinction, however, does not preclude
situations where the tie between close relationship and direct essentiality involves both qualities inextricably.107
Pertinent factors in "close relationship" are: time and/or place
of performance; purposes of the activities for which the employee
serves the particular employer; relative directness or indirectness of
the effect of the particular task on production; and whether employment is within or outside the productive enterprise. 0 8 This
element of relevance of place-factor in performance must be distinguished from the rule that place of work is not used by the
Administrator as one of the "guides" to coverage. Here place of
performance is pertinent to establish "close relationship" of employment not themselves direct engagements in commerce or production therefor.'0 °
(1 ) Factors Which DistinguishClose from Remote Relationship
The following can be listed as vital factors determining close relationship of an occupational activity to production as distinct from
10
remote relationship.
Contribution which the activity makes to production;
Who performs the activity?
When, where, and how is it performed with respect to the production to which it relates?
What is the purpose-to aid production or otherwise?
Immediacy (or ultimacy) of its effect on production;
Number and nature of any intervening operations between it
and the production concerned;
Characteristics
and purposes (if pertinent) of employer's busi1
ness.' '
In some situations, where particular work is genuinely directly
essentialto production, it is performed by the workers of an operator
other than the producer, and the degree of such essentiality may be
107. Ibid. As an example of inextricably combined close relationship

and direct essentiality, the Roland Elec. case, see note 72 supra, involved a
worker employed in repairing electric motors used in factories producing goods

for commerce.
108.

Interp. Bull., No. 776, 24.

109. FLSA § 4(f) (1938).
110. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 24.
111. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108 (1946) ; Borden v. Borella, 325
U. S. 679 (1945) ; 10 E. 40th St. Bldg. v. Callus, 325 U. S. 578 (1945) ; Armour
& Co. v. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126 (1944) ; Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S.
517 (1942).
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a significant factor in determining "close relationship." Such cases
illustrate the interrelationship of the two principles.
None of the factors given above is of itself alone a necessarily
controlling determinant. In given situations factors other than those
listed may emerge as more vital. Facts of an individual situation are
determinant. The sum of all relevant factors determines closeness
of relationship of any given activity to production.11(2) PracticalJudgment Needed to Fix Degree in
"Direct Essentiality" Cases
Many "direct essentiality" situations in production coverage
problems involve practical judgments as to degree of essentiality
and of directness concerning -the function and need of any activity
to a successful, effective, and efficient production enterprise."1
Occupations in a producing plant may be directly essential (for
example, machinery repair, clerical, and custodial employment),
but vary in the degree of their particular essentiality and in the
directness of their particular aid to the productive process. 114 Coverage may depend upon this degree of essentiality.
An industrial enterprise which provides something essential to
meet the immediate needs of production (for example, the manufacture of machinery, tools, or dies for use in the production of
goods for commerce) is no 1ess directly essential merely because
distribution, transportation, or installation of such contributory
products intervenes before these instruments can be used in production." 5
(3) Examples of Covered Employments in Closely Related and
Directly Essential Production for Commerce
Many "office" or "white collar" employees, are covered because
their occupations, if not actually a part of the production, are closely
related and directly essential to it. Included under such coverage
are: bookeepers, stenographers, clerks, accountants, payroll clerks,
timekeeping employees, time-study workers, draftsmen, inspectors,
testers, research workers, industrial safety men; employees in personnel, advertising, promotion, labor relations, and public relations activities of a producing enterprise; work instructors."'
112. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 25.
113. Ibid.
114. 10 E. 40th St. Bldg. v. Callus, 325 U. S. 578 (1945) ; Kirschbaum
v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942) ; Sen. St., Cong. Rec. 15372 (1949).
115. Walling v. Hamner, 64 F. Supp. 690 (W.D. Va. 1946).
116. H. Mgrs. St. 14 (1949) ; Sen. St., Cong. Rec. 15372 (1949).
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Similarly, workers engaged in maintaining, servicing, repairing,
or improving the buildings of a producing enterprise; or performing
similar tasks on machinery, equipment, vehicles, or other facilities
11 7
used in the production of goods for commerce are covered.
Custodial and protective employees such as caretakers, watchmen,
guards, patrolmen, firemen, stockroom workers, and warehousemen,
are covered unless specifically exempted by some other provision
of the Act. 1 8
Transportation workers who transport supplies, equipment,
materials to the producer's premises; those who remove slag or
other waste materials therefrom; or others who perform any
transportation activities needed in production, likewise are entitled
to the coverage benefits of FLSA. Machinists, carpenters, electricians, plumbers, steamfitters, plasterers, glaziers, painters, metalworkers, hodcarriers, bricklayers, roofers, stationary engineers, and
the apprentices and helpers of all these, are embraced in the foregoing category, as are elevator operators and starters, janitors, charwomen, porters, handymen, and messengers."19
c. Distinctions between Covered and Noncovered Workers in
Similar Production Occupations
Not all employees of a genuine producer of goods for commerce
are considered to be themselves engaged in such production. If
they are employed solely in connection with any local operations of
the producer independently of his productive enterprise; or in some
dispensable or collateral activity not directly essential to the productive function, they are not entitled to the wages and hours
benefits of the Act.
A producer, for instance, may engage in incidental local activities
as a landlord, merchant, or restaurateur either to provide, primarily,
a convenient means of meeting the personal needs of his employees
such as housing, sale of commodities, feeding, or to take advantage
of the opportunity to realize additional and separate profit. Workers
117. No distinction of statutory or economic significance can be drawn
between such work in a building where the production of goods is carried

on physically and in one where such production is controlled, administered,

and managed. Borden v. Borella, 325 U. S. 679 (1945). In the Schulte

case, see note 111 supra, the Court held that maintenance workers employed
in a loft building tenanted by business that performed process work on goods

belonging to our-of-state owners, were covered as engaged in employments
necessary to the production of goods. (Today the closely-related-directlyessential principle wiould be applied.)

118. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 26.
119. Ibid.
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exclusively employed in such essentially local activities of providing
residential, eating, or other living facilities for genuine production
workers of a producer are not considered as engaged in work closely
related or directly essential to their employer's principal activity
of producing goods for commerce. 120
But this exclusion from coverage does not deprive all cooks
and helpers of the benefits of wages and hours provisions of the
Act. Again the principle of each case being determined by its own
circumstances must be applied to distinguish between covered and
noncovered workers performing the same tasks. In an isolated lumber or mining camp, where the operation of a cook-house is a vital
part of the productive process, kitchen employees may in fact be
"closely related" and "directly essential" to the production of goods
for commerce. 121
As we have seen, such services as watchman, guarding, maintenance and repair of buildings, facilities, and equipment used in the
production of goods for commerce are "directly essential" as well
as "closely related" to such production. 12 2 But the same kind of tasks

performed in or in connection with private dwellings, owned by the
producer and tenanted under lease by employees of the producer, as
in a mill or mining village, would not be "directly essential" to production, and therefore not covered.

123

Likewise, those employees of a producer who are engaged only
in maintaining company facilities for entertaining the employer's
customers; or in providing food, refreshments, or recreational facilities (including restaurants, cafeterias, and snack bars), for the
producer's employees in a factory, or in operating a children's
nursery for the convenience of employees who leave young children
there during working hours, or in similar desirable but not indispensable social welfare activities, would not be doing work "directly
essential" to the production of goods for commerce and hence would
not be covered.

24

120. Brogan v. National Surety Co., 246 U. S. 257 (1918) ; H. Mgrs.
St. 14-15 (1949) ; cf. Sen. St., Cong. Rec. 15372 (1949).
121. Brogan v. National Surety Co., 246 U. S. 257 (1918) ; Hanson v.
Lagerstrom, 133 F. 2d 120 (8th Cir. 1943); Consolidated Timber Co. v.
Womack, 132 F. 2d 101 (9th Cir. 1942).
122. Borden v. Borella, 325 U. S. 679 (1945); Walton v. Southern
Package Corp., 320 U. S. 540 (1944) ; Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517

(1942).

123. See cases cited note 121 supra; Wilson v. Reconstruction Finance
Corp., 158 F. 2d 564 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 810 (1947).
124. H. Mgrs. St. 14-15 (1949), cited in Interp. Bull., No. 776, 27-28.
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5. Employees of Independent Operators Meeting Needs of
Producers for Commerce
Activities of independent operators must meet the "closely
related" test. In situations where a worker's tasks are "closely
related" and "directly essential" to the production of goods for
commerce, the mere fact that he is employed by an independent
operator rather than the actual producer would not deprive him
of the benefits of the Act to which he would be entitled if employed
-

2
by a producer of the goods. ' 5

If such work, performed for an employer not himself a producer,
is manifestly "directed essential" but not "closely related" as well,
coverage does not extend to employees of such independent employers.120 The dividing line in many such cases is very thin indeed.
The independent employer may carry on an essentially local business without intent or purpose on his part to aid in the production of
goods for commerce, regardless of the fact that actually his operation is directly essential to the production of goods for commerce.
In such situations the activity of the independent employer is not
deemed "closely related.'

1 27

However, the mere fact of the local nature of the employer's
business may not negate the "closely related" principle. A large
measure of "direct essentiality" in the independent employer's
processing might be such as to carry with it a sufficient degree of
close relationship on the part of the employee's occupation as to
1
warrant coverage under the Act.

28

When independent employers operate businesses definitely intended for providing producers of goods for commerce with materials or services directly essential to such production, their business activities are very probably closely enough related to such
production as to bring their workers under coverage. 129 Moreover,
all the employees of such independent operators engaged in the
activity of meeting such needs of a bonafide producer for commerce
are brought within the benefits of the wages and hours provisions of
FLSA.1 30°
125. Farmers' Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U. S. 755 (1949) ; Roland
Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657 (1946); Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316
U. S. 517 (1942).
126. 10 E. 40th St. Bldg. v. Callus, 325 U. S. 578 (1945).
127. Ibid.
128. Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S. 88 (1942).
129. 10 E. 40th St. Bldg. v. Callus, 325 U. S. 578 (1945) ; H. Mgrs.

St. 14 (1949).
130.

Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657 (1946)

(foremen,

mechanics and helpers, trouble shooters, and office employees of companies sell-
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Coverage extends to all employees of independent operators,
engaged in maintenance, custodial, and clerical work which is performed by their employer for manufacturer, mining company, or
other producer for commerce. As summarily appears in H. MAgrs.
St. 1949: "All such employees perform activities that are closely
related and directly essential to the production of goods for com13
merce." '
a. Some Typical Situations of Coverage for Employees of
Independent Operators; 'Segregation' Required
Where the independent operator supplies producers of goods
for commerce with things as directly essential to production as
electric motors or other machinery or machinery parts for use in
producing the goods of a manufacturer, or for mining operations,
or for production of oil, or for other production operations or products, the relation between such activities and production is so close
and immediate as to bring the employees of such independents
within the benefits of coverage. Similarly, suppliers of power, fuel,
or water required for the production operations are covered."'
The fact that the essential needs of producers mentioned or
indicated in the above paragraph are supplied through businesses
having local aspects cannot alter their close relationship and direct
essentiality to the producers who are customers of the independent
employer. "Such sales and services must be immediately avail3
able to.. . (the) customers or their production will stop."'"
Employees of independent employers providing such essential
goods and services to producers and meeting the "closely related"
test, will not be removed from coverage because an unsegregated
ing and servicing electric motors, generators, and equipment for commercial
and industrial firms) ; Kirschbaunm v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942) (covering stationary engineers and firemen, watchmen, elevator operators, electricians, carpenters and helpers engaged in maintaining and servicing loft
building for producers); Walling v. Thompson, 65 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. Cal.
1946) (installment and service men, shop men, bookkeepers, salesmen, and
dispatcher-employees of company supplying burglar alarm service to producers) ; Phillips v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 63 F. Supp. 733 (D.
Minn. 1945) (office employees and outside workers of L&P Company
serving producers); Walling v. New Orleans Private Patrol -Service, 57
F. Supp. 143 (E.D. La. 1944) (guards, watchmen, and office employees of
company providing patrol service for producers).
131. H. Mgrs. St. 14 (1949), quoted in Interp. Bull., No. 776, 31.
132. Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S.657 (1946); Reynolds v.
Salt River Valley Water Users Ass'n, 143 F. 2d 863 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Walling
v. Hammer, 64 F. Supp. 690 (W.D. Va. 1946); Phillips v. Meeker Coop.
Light & Power Ass'n, 63 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1945); Holland v. Amoskeag Mach. Co., 44 F. Supp. 884 (D. N.H. 1942) ; Princeton Mining Co. v.
Veach, 116 Ind. App. 332, 63 N. E. 2d 306 (1945).
133. Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S.657 (1946).
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portion of their work is performed for customers other than producers of goods for commerce. Examples of occupations in which
the work of employees is unsegregated as between producers and
non-producers of goods for commerce are: public utilities furnishing
gas, electricity, or water, both to firms within the State engaged in
manufacturing, mining, or other forms of producing goods for
commerce, and to customers who are non-producers. Workers in
34
these public utilities are entitled to benefits of the ActY.
The employees of independent employers who provide to manufacturers, mining, companies, or other producers for commerce such
items used in their production as tools, dies, patterns, designs, blueprints, are engaged in work that meets both tests--"closely related"
as well as "directly essential." 13 So too are the employees of an
independent employer who produces and supplies cast-shed, core,
and molding sands to a steel mill to meet specifications in the production of steel. Another field of covered work is that of employees
of industrial laundry and linen supply companies serving the needs
36
of customers who manufacture or mine goods for commerce.
1).Some Distinctions Between Covered and Non-Covered L[orkers
in Sinilar Occupations of Independents
Some employments are not sufficiently direct in their essentiality
to the production of goods to come within the coverage of the Act.
For example, activities of a local architectural firm including the
preparation of plans for the alteration of buildings which are used
to produce goods for interstate commerce; its employees are not
covered. 37 Employees of an independently owned and operated
restaurant, located in a factory, are not engaged in an activity
sufficiently essential or sufficiently direct in their essentiality to
production of goods for commerce to come within coverage under
the Act."3"
Such distinctions indicate the existence of borderline cases. Another illustrative contrast distinguishes between employees constructing a dike to prevent the flooding of an oil field producing oil
for commerce, and contra, employees of a material man quarrying,
processing, and transporting stone to the construction site for use
in that dike. The construction employees are doing work both di134.
135.
136.
62 N. Y.
137.
138.

H. Mgrs. St. 14 (1949) ; Sen. St., Cong. Rec. 15372 (1949).
Walling v. Amidon, 153 F. 2d 159 (10th Cir. 1946).
Koerner v. Asso. Linen Laundry Suppliers, 270 App. Div. 986,
S. 2d 774 (1st Dep't 1946).
McComb v. Turpin, 81 F. Supp. 86 (D. Md. 1948).
Bayer v. Courtemanche, 76 F. Supp. 193 (D: Conn. 1947).
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rectly essential and closely related to production; work of the
material man's employees is too remote from production to be
considered closely related thereto.1' 9
A further operational situation which makes clear the distinction
between covered and noncovered employees (besides those classes
of employees and employees tasks specifically exempted in the Act),
involves mine props for the production of coal. Employees engaged
in producing these mine props are occupied in work closely and
sufficiently immediate to the production of coal sold in interstate
commerce, whereas employees of a sawmill-equipment-handling
firm, selling such equipment to the producer of the mine props are
engaged in work too far removed from the covered production.140
A less obvious and more complex situation arises in farming.
Workers of a supplier of water for irrigation purposes to farmers
who grow products shipped to other States are covered as being
engaged in work closely related and directly essential to the production of goods for commerce. Employees of power companies supplying power to such farmers are similarly covered.' 4' Employees of
producers or suppliers of feed for poultry and livestock, or seed for
of
crops, used by farmers (within the State) in the production 142
goods shipped out of the State, are covered for the same reasons.
In contrast to these covered employments-incidental yet essential and indispensable-workers in a local fertilizer plant producing
fertilizer for use by farmers within the same State to improve the
productivity of the land used in growing products shipped outside
the State, are no longer (especially since the 1949 amendments)
considered adequately close in their relationship to production for
commerce. 43 However, prior to the 1949 amendments to FLSA
such employees were considered necessary to production of goods
for commerce. Fertilizer is ordinarily thought of today as assimilable to the soil rather than to the crop, and hence virtually less
directly essential to production of farm crops, even when the product goes into interstate commerce, than are water, livestock feed, or
seed. This is one of the very few classes of employees to suffer elimination in the generally broadening inclusiveness of coverage exten139. E. C. Schroeder Co. v. Clifton, 153 F. 2d 385 (10th Cir. 1946) ; H.
Mgrs. St. 15 (1949).
140. Walling v. Hamner, 64 F. Supp. 690 (W.D. Va. 1946).
141. Farmers' Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U. S. 755 (1949) ; Reynolds v. Salt River Valley Water Users Ass'n, 143 F. 2d 863 (9th Cir. 1944) ;
Phillips v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 63 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn.
1945).
142. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 34-35.
143. H. Mgrs. St. 15 (1949).

IVAGE-HOUR COVERAGE
tion"I and this elimination represents an outstanding effect of the

1949 Amendment to FLSA.
Repair and maintenance men working on machinery or buildings
used by a manufacturer in his production of goods for commerce,
and employees of a watchman, guard, patrol, or burglar alarm service protecting the producer's premises, are among the classes of
employees whose work clearly entitles them to coverage. But men
engaged in cleaning windows or cutting grass at the production
plant are not included if employed by a local window-cleaning company or a local independent nursery concern, and are so occupied
at the producing plant because the manufacturer is one of the service
company's customers.",
By the same reasoning, employees of a local exterminator service working wholly within a State exterminating pests in private
homes, local establishments, and in buildings within the State even
if any are used to produce goods for interstate commerce are not
included within the benefits of the wage and hour provisions of
FLSA.1 "r
6. The Goods Factor

a. "Goods" Defined and Illustrated
"Goods" is defined in § 3(i) of the Act to mean:
.. . goods (including Ships and Mfarine Equipment),
wares,
products, commodities, merchandise, or articles, or subjects of
commerce of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof
[italics supplied], but does not include goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor
thereof."
"Goods" as defined thus for the purposes of the Act are not limited
to commercial goods or articles of trade, nor, indeed, to tangible
property, but also include: "articles or subjects of commerce of any
character. 1' 47 Such things as "ideas ... orders, and intelligence are
subjects of commerce." Telegraphic messages have accordingly
been held to be "goods" within the meaning of the Act. 4s
By similar reasoning and interpretation, the courts have included
144. 'McComb v. Super-A Fertilizer NNorks, 165 F. 2d 824 (1st Cir.

1948).

145. See note 143 supra.

146. See note 143 supra.

147. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U. S.490 (1945). The legislative
history, as pointed out in this case, shows that the definition was originally

narrower, and that "subjects of commerce" were added by a Sen. amendment.
148. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U. S.490 (1945).
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printed items as newspapers, magazines, brochures, pamphlets,
bulletins, and announcements."-' Likewise:
written reports; fiscal and other statements and accounts; correspondence; lawyers' brieis; and other kindred documents ;150
advertising ; motion pictures; newspaper copy; radio script; artwork; Mss. for publication ;511
sample books used by salesmen for purposes of illustrating their
products

152

letterheads, envelopes, shipping tags, labels, checkbooks, blank
books, book covers; advertising circulars; candy wrappers.',,
Therefore, employees engaged in producing these various articles
swell the millions of covered workers.
"Goods" also include insurance policies, 54 bonds, stocks, bills
of exchange, bills of lading, checks, drafts, negotiable notes, and
other "commercial paper."155
Similarly "goods" comprises such articles, subjects, or instruments of trade, commerce, transportation, or transmission among
the States, as these:
gold ;'r

ships,15 7 vehicles, 5 s and aircraft,"59 as "goods" before they became instruments of commerce;
livestock ;'Go

poultry and eggs;161
149. Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U. S. 178 (1946) ; Ullo v.
Smith, 62 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 177 F. 2d 101 (2d Cir. 1949) ;
Berry v. 34 Irving Place Corp., 52 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. N.Y. 1943) ; Yunker
v. Abbye Employment Agency, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 715 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1941) ;
see 10 E. 40th St. Bldg. v. Callus, 325 U. S.578, 585 (1945) (dissenting
opinion).
150. Rausch v. Wolff, 72 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Ill. 1947); Phillips v.
Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 63 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1945);
Lofther v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 48 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1942).
151. Roberg v. Henry Phipps Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (2d Cir. 1946);
Baldwin v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bk., 150 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir.), cert. denied.
326 U. S.767 (1945) ; Schineck v.386 Fourth Ave. Corp., 49 N. Y. S. 2d
872 (N.Y. City Ct. 1944) ; Bittner v. Chicago Daily News Pub. Co., 4
V & H Cases 837, 29 CCH Lab. Cases 62479 (1944).
152. Walling v. Higgins, 47 F. Supp. 856 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
153. Walling v. Lacy, 51 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Colo. 1943) ; McAdams v.
Connelly, 8 W & H Cases 498, 16 CCH Lab. Cases ff 64963 (1948) ; Tobin
v. Grant, 8 W & H Cases 361 (1948).
154. Darr v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 169 F. 2d 262 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U. S.871 (1948).
155. Bozant v. Bank of N. Y., 156 F. 2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946).
156. Fox v. Summitt King Mines, 143 F. 2d 926 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Walling v. Haile Gold Mines, 136 F. 2d 102 (4th Cir. 1943).
157. Slover v. Wathen, 140 F. 2d 258 (4th Cir. 1944).
158. Hertz Drivurself Stations v. United States, 150 F. 2d 923 (8th
Cir. 1945).
159. Jack-on v. Northwest Airlines, 75 F. Suop. 32 (D. Minn. 1947).
160. Walling v. Friend, 156 F. 2d 429 (8th Cir. 1946).
161. Walling v. DeSoto Creamery & Produce Co.. 51 F. Supp. 938
(D. Minn. 1943).
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waste paper collected for shipment in commerce

;162

garments being rented (or laundered) ;163

ice ;13
containers and packing materials of many sorts (e.g.: cigar
boxes, wrapping paper, excelsior, etc.) for shipping other goods
in commerce ; 16
electric energy or power, gas, etc. ;""
16 7
by-products of manufacturing, shipped in commerce.
b. "Partsand Ingredients" of Goods are Themselves Goods
The "goods" provision of the Act (§ 3(i)) defines "goods" to
mean "goods... or any part or ingredientthereof" [italics supplied].
Many goods are processed or changed in form by one or more
intervening employers before entering the stream of interstate or
foreign commerce in their final form. This fact does not affect the
character of the original produce as "goods produced for commerce." This principle is illustrated by a garment manufacturer who
sends goods to an independent contractor within the State for
sewing; after they are returned to him, the garment man further
processes them and then ships them in interstate commerce. The
mere division of production functions between the two employers
does not alter the fact that the employees of the independent contractor, as well as those of the originating garment manufacturer,
are actually producing, because "working on," the goods, or "parts
or ingredients" thereof, which enter the channels of commerce. The
independent contractor's employees sewing on those goods which
later entered the flow of commerce, are covered.'
A manufacturer of buttons who sells his product within the State
to a manufacturer of shirts, who ships his shirts with the buttons
sewn thereon in interstate commerce, must also comply with the
Act as it covers his employees; they are held to be engaged in the
production of goods for commerce.' 69
Similarly, the employees of a lumber manufacturer who sells his
lumber locally to a furniture manufacturer who in turn sells his
162. Fleming v. Schiff, 1 W & H Cases 893, 5 CCH Lab. Cases ff
woJl4 (1941).

163. Phillips v. Star Overall Dry Cleaning Laundry Co., 149 F. 2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U. S. 780 (1946).
164. Atlantic Co. v. Walling, 131 F. 2d 518 (5th Cir. 1942); Hamlet
Ice Co. v. Fleming, 127 F. 2d 165 (4th Cir. 1942).
165. Enterprise Box Co. v. Fleming, 125 F. 2d 897 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 316 U. S. 704 (1942).
166. Walling v. Connecticut Co., 154 F. 2d 552 (2d Cir. 1946).
167. Walling v. Peoples' Packing Co., 132 F. 2d 236 (10th Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 318 U. S.774 (1943).
168. Schulte Co. v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108 (1946).
169. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 39-40.
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furniture in interstate commerce, -come within the scope of the

Act. 7 0 Thus, any employee who is engaged in the production of any
part or ingredient of goods produced for trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States
...is engaged in the production of goods for commerce.' 7'
c. Effect of the Exclusionary Clause in the Statutory
Definition of "Goods"
The purpose of the exclusionary clause 17 2 in the statutory definition of "goods" which excepts goods "after their delivery into the
actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof, other
than a producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof," is to protect
ultimate consumers (other than producers, manufacturers, or
processors of the particular goods). 7 3 from the "hot goods" provision of the Act.' 7 4 By so defining "goods" as to exclude goods
after their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate
consumer (other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor
thereof), Congress made it clear that it did not intend to hold the
ultimate consumer in violation of § 15 (a) (1) of the Act penalizing
7
For example, a
transportation of "hot goods" across a State lineY1

purchaser of a pair of shoes for himself from a retail store, who then
carries them across a State line, is not himself guilty of a violation
of the Act even though the shoes were produced in violation
thereof.'7 6
Contrariwise, workers are covered who are engaged in building
a boat for delivery to the purchaser (ultimate consumer) at the
the building
boat yard, the employer knowing or believing during
77
that the purchaser will sail it outside the State.
170. Ibid.
171.

Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657 (1946); Walling v.

W. D. Haden Co., 153 F. 2d 196 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Walling v. Comet Carriers,

151 F. 2d 107 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Bracey v. Luray, 138 F. 2d 8 (4th Cir. 1943) ;
Hanson v. Lagerstrom, 133 F. 2d 120 (8th Cir. 1943) ; Mid-Continent Pipe
Line Co. v. Hargrave, 129 F. 2d 655 (10th Cir. 1942) ; Walling v. Griffin
Cartage Co., 62 F. Supp. 396 (E.D. Mich. 1945), aff'd, 153 F. 2d 587 (6th
Cir. 1946) ; Walling v. Kerr, 47 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1942) ; Boling v.
R. J. Allison Co., 4 W&H Cases 500 (1944).
172. FLSA § 15(a)(1).
173. Phillips v. Star Overall Dry Cleaning Laundry Co., 149 F. 2d 416

(2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U. S. 780 (1946) ; Southern Advance Bag
&Paper Co. v. United States, 133 F. 2d 449 (5th Cir. 1943).

174. This section makes it unlawful for any person "to transport ... or
ship ... in commerce... any goods" produced in ziolation of the W & H
provisions of the Act. [Italics supplied.] See also Jackson v. Northwest Airlines, 75 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1947).
175. Hamlet Ice Co. v. Fleming, 127 F. 2d 165 (4th Cir. 1942).
176. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 41.
177. Joshua Hendy Corp. v. Mills, 169 F. 2d 898 (9th Cir. 1948) ; St.
...
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1952]

d. Special Significance of the Prepositionin the Phrase
"for Commerce"
Goods are produced "for" commerce where the employer intends,
hopes, expects, or has reason to believe that the goods or any
unsegregated part of them, in the same or in an altered form or as
a part or ingredient of other goods, will move in interstate or
7

foreign commerce.1

If such movement of the goods in commerce can be reasonably
known or expected beforehand by the employer when his workers
perform tasks defined in the Act as production of such goods, it
matters nothing whether he himself, or a subsequent owner or
possessor, puts the goods into the stream of commerce17 9 The actual
movement of the goods in interstate commerce is strong (though
not conclusive) evidence that the employer intended, hoped, expected, or had reason to believe that they would so move. 180
Questions have risen as to whether a given work done on goods
may constitute production 'for' commerce even though the goods
do NOT eventually leave the State. Situations involving whether
production of goods is for commerce (and hence covered by the
Act) or not, fall into two main classes: (1) Goods produced intentionally for direct furtherance of interstate movement; (2) goods
disposed of locally to persons who subsequently place them in
commerce.""
(1) Goods ProducedIntentionallyfor Direct Furtherance
of Interstate Movement
Whenever goods are produced for movement among the several
States, such goods are produced for commerce, whether or not
there is any expectation or reason to expect that the particular
goods, or any part of the total product, will leave the State.8 2 For
example, ice is produced for commerce when it is produced for
use by interstate rail or motor carriers in the refrigeration or
cooling of the equipment in which the interstate traffic actually
Johns River Shipbuilding Co. v. Adams, 164 F. 2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1947);
Walling v. Armbruster, 51 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Ark. 1943) ; Walling v. Lowe,
5 W&H Cases 936, 10 CCH Lab. Cases ff 63033 (1946).
178. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108 (1946) ; Warren-Bradshaw Drilling
Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S. 88 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100

(1941).
179. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108 (1946) ; Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S. 88 (1942).
180. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 42.
181. Id. at 42-45.
182. Fleming v. Atlantic Co., 40 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ga. 1941), aff'd,
131 F. 2d 518 (5th Cir. 1942).
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moves, even though the particular ice may melt before the vehicle
or equipment in which it is p'aced leaves the State. The ice produced for such use enters also into the process of transportation in
which the burdens of traffic are borne.183
Electrical energy produced and sold within a single State for
such uses as lighting and operating signals on railroads and at
airports and bus terminals to guide interstate traffic; lighting and
operating radio stations which broadcast programs interstate; and
lighting and transmission of messages by telephone and telegraph
companiesll"--all these are covered because used in production for
commerce.
Similar principles apply to the production of the following:
Water or fuel for use in the operation of railroads with which
interstate commerce is carried on;
Radio or television scripts which provide the basis for programs broadcast interstate;
Telephone and telegraph poles for use in the necessary maintenance, repair, or improvement of interstate communication
systems;
Crushed rock, ready-mixed concrete, crossties, culvert pipe,
bridge timbers, and kindred items for use in the required repair,
maintenance, or improvement of railway roadbeds and bridges
which serve as the instrumentalities over which interstate traffic
moves;
Goods for use in the 'direct furtherance' of the movement of
commerce on highways, pipelines, and waterways which likewise serve as instrumenta'ities of interstate and foreign commerce;1s5
Materials for use in the necessary repair, maintenance, or improvement of any such instrumentality so as to prevent impairing or impeding the flow of commerce,sG such for example
as stone or ready-mixed concrete, crushed rock, sand, gravel
for bridges Qr dams; and these 'materials'18 7 for road mending
and surfacing;
183. See note 164 supra; Southern United Ice Co. v. Hendrix, 153 F.
2d 689 (6th Cir. 1946) ; Chapman v. Home Ice Co., 136 F. 2d 353 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U. S. 761 (1943) ; Hansen v. Salinas Valley Ice Co., 62 Cal.
App. 2d 357, 144 P. 2d 896 (1st Dist. 1944). But workers producing ice at a
local plant which delivers the ice for a water cooler in the local railroad
station are not covered because this ice is not "for" commerce. Interp. Bull.,
No. 776, 44.
184. Lewis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 154 F. 2d 751 (5th Cir.
1946) ; Walling v. Connecticut Co., 154 F. 2d 552 (2d Cir. 1946).
185. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 43.
186. McComb v. Carter, 8 W&H Cases 498, 16 CCH Lab. Cases 164964
(1948) ; Walling v. Staffen, 5 W&H Cases 1002, 11 CCH Lab. Cases ff 63102
(1946). Contra: Engelbretson v. E. J. Albrecht Co.. 150 F. 2d 602 (7th Cir.
1945) ; McComb v. Trimmer, 85 F. Supp. 565 (D. N.J. 1949).
187. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 43.
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Concrete or galvanized pipe for road drainage: bridge planks
and timbers; paving blocks.
All such items when so used are held by the courts as produced for
commerce even though they do not leave the State where produced."
If any of the materials indicated are supplied by a materialman
engaged in an essentially local business serving various local customers without any substantial part of the business being devoted
to the needs of highway repair or reconstruction, those materials
would not be held by the Administrator to be for commerce; con"equently workers engaged in providing them would not be covered. " '
(2) Facts at Time of 'Production'
Determine Coverage
Borderline cases do arise. In each situation the facts must be
examined. One such case involved a lumber manufacturer who
produced lumber to fill an out-of-State order. Before the product
could be shipped, or could be delivered for shipment, it was destroyed by fire. The employees were held covered because producing
for commerce. The facts at time of production, not at some subsequent time, govern the answer as to coverage. 0 0
The Wages and Hour Administration held that if the above
lumber had been intended for a local contractor to build a schoolhouse within the State, the workers engaged in the production
would not be producing for commerce, and therefore would not be
covered. If something should cause that lumber to be sold to another
purchaser who ships it out-of-State, the status of the production
workers cannot thereby be retroactively changed to bring them
within the benefits of the Act.' 0 '
Similarly, workers drilling for oil which the employer intends
to ship out of the State either as crude or refined product are
producing for commerce while drilling operation proceeds, and
they are therefore covered. This decision obtains even if some of
1
the wells prove dry. "(3) Goods Sold Locally to Persons Who
Place Them in Commerce
Goods sold locally to persons who put them in commerce, if
the original producer believes or expects, intends or hopes that his
188. Ibid.
189. Interp. Bull., No. 776, 43-44.
190. Culver v. Bell & Loffland, 146 F. 2d 29 (9th Cir. 1944).
191. Interp. Bull., No. 776. 45.
192. Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S. 88 (1942).
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customer or a subsequent pu:cchaser will ship out-State, are produced 'for' commerce and the employees producing them are
covered. Whether or not the original producer passes title to the
goods to a purchaser within the State, whether for local consumption or out-of-State shipment, is immaterial.' 93 Coverage applies
in these cases, whether or not goods so produced are sold f.o.b.
factory, or sold within State for later out-State shipment by the
subsequent purchaser; it is likewise extended to goods which do
not belong to the producer but are merely produced or processed
or otherwise worked on by the 'producer' and then returned or
delivered to the owner who ships out of State." 4
Coverage is also extended, as occupied in production for commerce, to workers engaged in manufacturing, handling, working
on, or otherwise employed in producing boxes, barrels, bags, crates,
bottles, wrapping or packing materials which their employer has
reason to believe will be used to contain the goods of other producers which will be sent out-State in such wrappings and containers. In such transactions -and situations, both the producer of
the goods to be shipped and the producer of the containers and
packing and wrapping materials, may be located in the same State.
This sameness of locale would. have no bearing, for it is the goods
and their destination which determine coverage of workers producing them. 95
Such containers and packing and wrapping materials when
themselves shipped empty out-of-State, are 'in commerce' and the
employees engaged in their purchasing, loading, or transporting, are
therefore, and by that fact, covered; they do not depend on the
production classification 196 'for commerce.'
III. SuMIrAmR AND CONCLUSIONS
The core of FLSA is its Wage-Hour provisions §§ 6 and 7,
§ 6 dealing with minimum wages and § 7 with maximum hours. Operational and administrative difficulties and coverage litigation stem
193. Bracey v. Luray, 138 F. 2d 8 (4th Cir. 1943) ; Hamlet Ice Co. v.
Fleming, 127 F. 2d 165 (4th Cir. 1942).
194. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108 (1946) ; Walling v. Kerr, 47 F.
Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
195. Dize v. Maddrix, 144 F. 2d 584 (4th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324 U. S.
697 (1945) ; Enterprise Box Co. v. Fleming, 125 F. 2d 897 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 316 U. S. 704 (1942) ; Walling v. Burch, 5 W&H Cases 323, 9 CCH
Lab. Cases fi 62613 (1945) ; Fleming v. Schiff, 1 W&H Cases 893, 5 CCH
Lab. Cases f 60864 (1941).
196. Atlantic Co. v. Weaver, 150 F. 2d 843 (4th Cir. 1945) ; Klotz v.
Ippolito, 40 F. Supp. 422 (S.D. Tex. 1941) ; Orange Crush Bottling Co. v.
Tuggle, 70 Ga. App. 144, 27 S. E. 2d 769 (2d Div. 1943).
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profusely from these two provisions. When maximum hours are
exceeded extra compensation must be paid. Forty hours is the
standard workweek and 75 cents an hour the minimum wage.
Extra remuneration for overtime must be paid at a rate not less
than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay. Other sections
of § 7 provide for inescapable modifications to meet specified situations.'

7

The purpose of the Act is to prohibit shipment in interstate
commerce of goods produced under substandard labor conditions,
a proper exercise by Congress of its power under the Commerce
clause.
The Act is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed. The nature of the worker's tasks govern coverage; he must
be engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce or in some occupation or process closely related and directly
essential thereto.
Decisions arising under §§ 6 and 7 of the Act hinge upon the
meaning of numerous vital terms. All the significant terms used
in §§ 1 through 19 of the Act are defined in §3. The most basic
terms are employee, commerce, production, wage, and goods. The
significance of vital modifying expressions used in the Act is also
discussed and brought to bear on the basic elements. Wage and
Hour Coverage revolves around the precise nature of occupational
activities of workers in commerce and in production therefor. The
scope of this coverage will continue to expand and contract according to the response of governing forces to the dynamic reality of
our industrial life.
197. FLSA, as amended, 55 Stat. 756 (1941) ; 63 Stat. 446 c. 312 § 1
(1949) ; 63 Stat. 912 c. 736 § 7, 29 U. S. C. § 207 (Supp. 1951). See Walling
v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U. S. 624 (1942) wherein is established the principle
of determining a valid method of payment in employments requiring irregular
hours. See Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U. S. 419
(1945) for determining regular pay under piece-work conditions.

